Abstract Cartel detection is one of the most basic and most complicated tasks of competition authorities. In recent years, however, variance filters have provided a fairly simple tool for rejecting the existence of price-fixing, with the added advantage that the methodology requires only a low volume of data. In this paper we analyze two aspects of variance filters: (i) the relationship that can be established between market structure and price rigidity, and (ii) the use of different benchmarks for implementing the filters. This paper addresses these two issues by applying a variance filter to a gasoline retail market that is characterized by a set of unique features. Our results confirm the positive relationship between monopoly and price rigidity, and confirm the variance filter's ability to detect non-competitive behavior when an appropriate benchmark is used. Our findings should serve to promote the implementation of this methodology among competition authorities, albeit in the awareness that a more exhaustive complementary analysis is required.
Introduction
Competition authorities pursue price-fixing conspiracies in three stages: detection, prosecution and penalization (Abrantes-Metz and Bajari 2009). However, the detection of such a conspiracy or of some kind of price collusion is not always a straightforward task, even though leniency programs can enhance the effectiveness of competition policy in those countries that choose to adopt them (Borrell and Jiménez 2008) . 1 However, one relatively simple way of analyzing the sectors is by "screening". Following Abrantes-Metz and Bajari (2009), a screen comprises a statistical test that can identify those markets in which competition problems are likely to exist and, subsequently, which companies in that particular market are likely to be involved in a conspiracy. This mechanism can thus be used to conduct a preliminary analysis for identifying anomalous behavior in markets. 2 Once such behavior has been detected, a more exhaustive analysis can be carried out. 3 The methodology involves implementing two strategies: first, detecting events that appear improbable unless the companies in that industry have coordinated their actions; and second, monitoring a control group. Prices that appear anomalous when compared to those in other markets point to a problem of competition. 4 This article seeks to shed further light on these two strategies involved in applying the variance filter by drawing on empirical evidence for the retail gasoline market in the Canary Islands (Spain). This market has a number of notable characteristics: The first is that competition authorities have investigated the retail gasoline market in Spain several times. 5 The second is that the Canary Island gasoline markets are either a monopoly or an oligopoly, depending on the island; and this enables us first to test whether prices are more (or less) rigid in a monopolistic market, and second, to highlight the importance of finding a benchmark for comparison to make it easier
